Why Choose the Difference Principle?

On Rawls, Distributive Justice, and How to Build a Fair Society

Kyle Devitt Lee

Abstract: John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance”[1] is a thought experiment in which parties designing a just society are necessarily ignorant of their socioeconomic starting position. In this paper, I analyze Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and consider whether or not rational humans would follow his Kantian moral reasoning when blinded by the veil of ignorance. This project begins with an exposition of Rawls’s principle of difference and then considers its implications and potential issues. Although some scholars claim the difference principle is the most important part of Rawls’s overall political theory, I argue that his principle of redress, principle of fair and equal opportunity, and the liberty principle do enough to ward off the possibility of scapegoating and other potential downsides of utilitarianism.

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John Rawls’s difference principle deals with how to assess the justice of the distribution of goods in a society. It is a qualified principle of equality. In a Theory of Justice, the parties in the original position of designing a fair society begin from an equitable division of social primary goods, and the least advantaged persons have a sort of veto power.[2] By using equality as the metric of comparison, “the difference principle” entails that the well-situated people in a given society can only gain in ways that are justifiable from the standpoint of the least favored position in society.[3] This essay evaluates the arguments Rawls makes for his difference principle and considers the question of whether the difference principle is even needed, given how much would be required to realize Rawls’s fair value of political liberties and the fair equality of opportunity (FEO) principle.

We can distinguish as Rawls does between “social” and “natural” primary goods. To put it simply, the main “social primary goods”[4] are liberties, opportunities, and rights. Natural goods are depicted as innate intelligence, imaginative capacity, health, and so on.

The FEO principle demands that social offices, e.g., jobs and political positions, be formally accessible and allocated meritocratically; however, additionally, each member of society will have a fair chance to attain these offices. Rawls developed the most influential principle of fair equality of opportunity and hence I will use his formulation, which entails a fair opportunity to influence and take part in “the political process.”[5] Individuals with similar motivations and capacities ought to have an approximately equal chance of advancing to positions of societal influence.

Let us continue with the justification Rawls gives for the extent of equal political liberty. When a state constitution restricts the authority of political majorities, either by limiting their legislative powers or by necessitating a larger plurality for specific measures, then “equal political liberty is less extensive.”[6] If the fair value of political liberty is codified into law and ascribed to, restrictions placed upon individuals are likely to weigh evenly on all stratums of society. The freedom for political participation loses most of its value when people with mass wealth and resources are able to use their economic might to sway public policy. Income inequality and the like can lead to those in an advantaged situation exercising an undue influence over the process of lawmaking. Therefore, wealth and property distribution must be undertaken to satisfy the fair value of all “the equal political liberties.”[7]

Using wealth inheritance and class status as examples, let’s now evaluate the difference principle’s important relation to the principle of redress. Unjust inequalities demand redress, according to this theory. Since congenital and natural traits are undeserved, there should be a compensatory response to these inequalities.[8] For instance, one can see that citizens born into the business class of a capitalist society are better advantaged than those starting out in the bottom rung of the working class. Inherent advantages can manifest in an ability to afford a top-tier education, a considerable inheritance, or other types of endowments that may magnify disparities.

Notably, Rawls ties the principle of difference to the fraternity, redress, and efficiency principles. A brief discussion of these concepts and their direct relation to the difference principle will aid in explicating its scope, intended effects, and possible problems. Rawls presents the two principles comprising justice as fairness as: first, all members of society have an equal, indefeasible right to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties…compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all.”[9]Second, socioeconomic inequalities must satisfy two preconditions; economic and social inequalities must be managed for positions and offices accessible to each person via a system of fair equality of opportunity, and are to the maximum benefit of the worst-off people in society (difference principle).

The difference principle can apply to things like savings, income, and objective primary goods. Since this principle entails that any inequalities in the distribution of goods must be to the max benefit of the least advantaged persons, it fundamentally shapes society’s goals.[10] For the parties tasked with building a fair social contract in the initial situation, Rawls argues that the poorest and most disadvantaged amongst us must be heavily taken into account. Economic inequality is permissible so long as it benefits the least advantaged members of society, at least when compared to an even more unjust system.

The two principles of justice have been called egalitarian.[11] The difference principle is considered egalitarian in its demonstration of an orderly way to judge the structural socioeconomic inequity of a given society. While explicating this in chapter II of a Theory of Justice, income inequality and the distribution of wealth between different classes are used as examples to illustrate the principle of difference. To begin with, the author reasonably presumes that there are more socioeconomically disadvantaged people in society than highly advantaged ones.[12]

Rawls often compares the typical least disadvantaged person with the representative most disadvantaged person. Nonetheless, he concludes that adherence to the difference principle benefits everyone.[13] Assuming his preconditions, the parties under the original position always pick the system that minimizes harm to the least advantaged person because the standpoint of justice is the standpoint of those who are the worst off. To Rawls, utility is not the metric of justice; injustice is an inequality that ends up harming the worst-off people in society. If I am already at the bottom tier of society and subsequent inequality harms me, I would be worse off in that set of institutional arrangements. Therefore, I ought not to agree to it.

When parsing out societal distinctions in his thought experiment involving a constitutional convention, we can see Rawls claims that rationally self-interested parties with a sense of justice will settle on, among other things, the difference principle. The representative least advantaged individual “can be identified and his rational plan determined.”[14] A good and just society follows the principles of justice “which are collectively rational from the perspective of the original position.”[15] Because of this collective rationality, it is said that every person in the state of nature (original position) can therefore expect to better their current standing by forming a collective society.[16]

The redress principle and the difference principle are different but may yield some of the same results. The difference principle shapes the goals of a general system so that the network of institutions deemphasizes “technocratic values”[17] and economic efficiency. It can be seen as an attitude that considers the distribution of endowments as a collective good of sorts. All are said to be able to share in the better economic and social results allowed by the complementarities of its allotted distribution. The luckier individuals may be allowed to improve their good luck only if doing so also improves the situation of individuals born into naturally unlucky socioeconomic circumstances.

No one is deserving of their lucky endowments, nor is anyone entitled to an advantaged starting position, says the Rawlsian political scientist. The difference principle is intended to ground an organized society so that no one benefits or worsens their random assignment in the distribution of endowments or the situation they are born into without accepting or giving respective compensatory benefits in return. It is portrayed as a fair way of dealing with the arbitrariness of advantage[18] by privileging the underprivileged.

According to this line of reasoning, socioeconomic inequality is justified “only if lowering it would make the working class even more worse off.”[19] Hence, inequality is only permissible in a Rawlsian sense if reducing it would leave the least advantaged class in an even less promising situation than they already find themselves. So, in the scenario that, i.e., a wealth tax on top earners would successfully reduce inequality and thereby improve things for the least advantaged, it would be unjust not to impose this tax. Even so, because justice as fairness is a generalized theory, Rawls indicates that taxation specifics and similar legislative advocacies can be left to economists and other social scientists.[20]

Instead of considering the difference principle to be exclusively egalitarian, an advocate of the difference principle might claim that it is grounded in rational self-interest because one does not know who one is when epistemically blinded by the veil of ignorance. The upshot being, for example, one would not accept a racially discriminatory system since one does not know one’s ethnicity. Because one is unaware of who one will be and what class one will be born into, it would be irrational to settle on any societal organization that systematically deprivileges a particular religious, ethnic, or economic group because one could end up in any oppressed group of people.

While designing a political system and writing a constitution from this original position, justice should be a prerequisite for efficiency. A totally just system is itself efficient,[21] Rawls argues, and hence the principle of efficiency is compatible with the difference principle. This point is most demonstrable when the difference principle is fully achieved. It is impossible to improve the standings of the more advantaged people without increasing the standings of those worst off because, under the difference principle, the prospects of the least well-off people are to be maximized. When the principle of fair equality and the difference principle are both fully satisfied (and in a just system), Rawls’s definition of justice is compatible with his principle of efficiency.

The difference principle is predicated on the principle of fraternity[22] in that it forgoes better advantages unless they are at least inclusively beneficial to the people who are less advantaged. Rawls writes that of course, the fraternal feeling of brotherly care for one another is ideal, but not always present throughout societies and cultures. One can predict societal tensions that could arise from a strict implementation of the difference principle. Imagine an agreed-upon and organizing principle that gives a slight benefit to the least advantaged person, albeit at a major cost to middle-class earners. Rawls admits that theoretically, “the difference principle permits indefinitely large inequalities in return for small gains to the less favored.”[23]

What are the chances that I will end up at the bottom rung of society? Suppose the chances of this are relatively low. In that case, it might be unreasonable to follow the difference principle since it could be a low percentage chance that I, personally, will find myself in the least advantaged position.

As we have observed, the difference principle can establish discrepancies in society.[24] We can discern that the difference principle is not violated in a society where the distribution of goods is equal among all classes. If we are going to have an unequal society, then economic gains must also benefit the least advantaged citizens. Otherwise, the gains would violate the principle of difference and therefore be unjustified.

Absurd outcomes could result from an ardent adherence to this principle. When bettering things for the least advantaged person is extremely costly for other classes, many will not find the difference principle very convincing. Rawls presents the idea of chain connection to deal with concerns such as this, which entails that enhancing the prospects of the least advantaged people will multiply throughout the rest of society’s composite system and thereby improve everybody’s situation. Although, Rawls claims the difference principle isn’t dependent on the truth of this chain connection concept.[25] This remark is telling, considering that the notion of “chain connection” is not empirically proven or readily observable.

Officially, the difference principle is “a maximizing principle”[26] because it maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged class (so long as the higher-ranked lexical principles are not violated). Fully satisfying the difference principle is an improvement for everyone if we assume that curbing inequality has a chain connection to every socioeconomic position between the least advantaged and (in Rawls’s example) the entrepreneurial class.[27] If bettering the prospects for the entrepreneurs thereby benefits the working poor, then it also improves the situation of the lower-middle class via chain connection, so it goes.

Even though Rawls “shall not examine how likely it is that chain connection” holds, “it seems plausible that if the least advantaged benefit so do others in between.”[28] The verity of chain connection depends on fulfilling the other principles of justice and is seemingly unfalsifiable. It is an intuitive belief but not a wholly satisfying concept. Conceptually, chain connectivity bears some resemblance to the notion that a rising tide lifts all boats. “Chain Connection” was first introduced as a subsection of Democratic Equality and the Difference Principle, in which Rawls speculates that improving the prospects of the entrepreneurial class would incentivize economic efficiency and raise the prospects of the unluckier classes. He does not comment on the accuracy or likelihood of the inherent concept in chain connection, but feels that something like it would have to be in place if the principle of difference is to effectively curb economic inequality.[29]

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Some political thinkers argue that the difference principle is the most vital part of the overall Theory of Justice. However, this view underestimates just how radical the fair equality of opportunity principle and the liberty principle are. Although the constraints of a short paper on the difference principle do not leave much room to discuss all the intricacies of the liberty principles and the FEO, one can base a lot of Rawls’s far-reaching calls for more egalitarian economic policies on these two principles alone.

Tommie Shelby, for example, rarely discusses the difference principle in working out a non-ideal, Rawlsian approach to racial justice.[30] After all, the principle of fair opportunity already ensures that the system of cooperation follows pure procedural justice[31] without the added stipulations of the difference principle. It follows from the principle of fair equality of opportunity that political and bureaucratic positions are open and accessible to all, not only formally but in a manner that everyone has a genuinely fair chance to achieve.[32] If perfectly satisfied, this principle alone does quite a bit to even out the arbitrariness of people’s socioeconomic privileges.

Although Rawls’s first principle of justice is similar to John Stuart Mill’s principle of liberty and some other liberal thinkers, the justification is obviously different. I do not recall Mill writing anything reminiscent of Rawls’s insistence on the fair value of political liberties. The focus Rawls puts on equal opportunity and the fair value of political liberties sets him apart from previous liberals. When analyzing his work, one may wonder whether Rawls included the notion of “fair value” and the difference principle to answer Marx’s criticisms of liberalism, but this is never directly stated.

Although certain aspects of Rawls’s philosophy are consequentialist, the most interesting tenets of his political theory reside in their tension with utilitarianism, not in his occasional similarities with it. A Theory of Justice begins by placing itself against utilitarianism in favor of a social contract theory that “is highly Kantian in nature.”[33] Further on, Rawls explicitly states that the principles of justice which result from his theory are analogous to Kant’s “categorical imperatives.”[34] Kant interpreted categorical imperatives as principles of conduct applicable to an individual in light of his nature as an equal and free rational human being. In the Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness,[35] Rawls deemphasizes the universality of Kant’s ethics but incorporates other aspects of his reasoning, arguing that when individuals legislate with just and principled fairness, they should be acting in alignment with rational principles that they decide on as free and autonomous people “in an original position of equality.”[36]

The problem of envy is considered near the end of a Theory of Justice because “the inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle may be so great as to arouse envy to a socially dangerous extent.”[37] Rawls differentiates between “general envy” on the one hand — envy between distinct classes, such as the lower classes developing envy of those at the commanding heights of the economy. On the other hand, “particular envy” can occur within the same class when people compete for the same objects, pursuits, jobs, romantic interests, social capital, and the like. The difference principle accepts the probable stratification of society. Because of this, Rawls considers whether the principle of difference, practically speaking, might end up engendering a dangerous excess of general envy in a given society.

Rawlsian “envy” is mutually disadvantageous and perhaps even untenable in a good, stable situation of reflective equilibrium. In this context, reflective equilibrium is the result of a person reflecting on their moral sense of justice, in which they weigh and deliberate on their considered judgments about what constitutes a just society. As Rawls describes it, an individual reflects on “various proposed conceptions and he has either revised his judgments to accord with one of them or held fast to his initial convictions (and the corresponding conception).”[38]

The superior advantages of certain members of society are in return for compensatory benefits to the less advantaged. One with a liberal sense of justice does not consider those born with better prospects to be more deserving from a moral standpoint.[39] As we discussed, the difference principle can conceivably allow indefinitely large inequalities in return for small benefits to the worst off. This is not a problem for Rawls because a society’s wealth distribution and income inequality should be moderate and reasonable thanks to society’s background institutions, that is to say, the legal and political surrounding institutions.[40] However, one can envision how citizens in an unequal society might draw envious comparisons between one another about things such as their respective fortunes, prestige, differing quantities of goods, or economic starting places into which they are born.

Giving Rawls his due, he alleges that envy can be avoided if people come to see that the difference principle entails that economic and social inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to everyone’s collective advantage. Everyone — but notably the least advantaged — must agree that they are better off as a result of the accepted inequalities. Rawls includes among the social primary goods something he calls the social basis of self-respect, which is highly relevant to this discussion of envy. When considering if a well-ordered society will generate sentiments “of envy and patterns of psychological attitude that will undermine”[41] just and fair arrangements, Rawls proclaims self-respect as “the main primary good,”[42] arguing that envy is only excusable as a reasonable reaction to one’s loss of self-respect. Someone’s lesser position regarding objective primary goods might be so significant as to injure their self-respect, and they may then resent becoming envious.

Suppose the reasonableness or fairness of “the background institutions”[43] turns out to be lacking. In that instance, as is the case in certain societies, I maintain that the Problem of Envy[44] could be handled at least in part by rejecting the difference principle. Once we accept the liberty principle and the liberal principle of fair equality of opportunity from Rawls, it is difficult to believe that those behind the veil would insist on the difference principle, a principle that justifies and limits class inequality at the same time. Maintaining the fair value of political liberties already entails the public financing of elections and significant redistributions of wealth.

The difference principle is too extreme to embrace. In a game theory sense, the risk seems unwarranted. It is plausible that so long as the other two principles (FEO and liberty principle) are met, utilitarian justifications of class inequality are acceptable. The other two principles do enough to address concerns about being thrown under the bus by utilitarian calculations.

Bibliography

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1999)

Rawls, John. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press, 2007)

Shelby, Tommie. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (Harvard University Press, 2016)

[1] Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: 1999), pp. 118–123

[2] Ibid. p. 131

[3] Ibid. p. 77

[4] Ibid. p. 54

[5] Ibid. p. 197

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid. p. 198

[8] Ibid. p. 86

[9] Rawls, J. Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Harvard University Press: 2007), p. 267

[10] Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: 1999). p. 91

[11] Ibid. p. 471

[12] Ibid. p. 67

[13] Ibid. p. 70

[14] Ibid. p. 66

[15] Ibid. p. 505

[16] Ibid. p. 435

[17] Ibid. p. 87

[18] Ibid. p. 88

[19] Ibid. p. 68

[20] Ibid. p. 234

[21] Ibid. p. 69

[22] Ibid. pp. 90–91

[23] Ibid. p. 470

[24] Ibid. p. 439

[25] Ibid. p. 71

[26] Ibid. p. 439

[27] Ibid. p. 69

[28] Ibid. p. 71

[29] Ibid. p. 68

[30] Shelby, T. Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform (Harvard University Press: 2016), pp. 97–98

[31] Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press: 1999), p. 76

[32] Ibid. p. 63

[33] Ibid. xviii

[34] Ibid. p. 222

[35] Ibid. p. 221

[36] Ibid. P. 222

[37] Ibid. p. 466

[38] Ibid. p. 43

[39] Ibid. p. 470

[40] Ibid. pp. 242–247

[41] Ibid. p. 465

[42] Ibid. p. 468

[43] Ibid. p. 243

[44] I capitalize Problem of Envy here in order to refer to the entire section 81 of a Theory of Justice bearing that title, pp. 464–468